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Abstract
We compare two approaches to embedding joint distributions of random variables recorded under differ-
ent conditions (such as spins of entangled particles for different settings) into the framework of classical,
Kolmogorovian probability theory. In the contextualization approach each random variable is “automat-
ically” labeled by all conditions under which it is recorded, and the random variables across a set of
mutually exclusive conditions are probabilistically coupled (imposed a joint distribution upon). Analysis
of all possible probabilistic couplings for a given set of random variables allows one to characterize vari-
ous relations between their separate distributions (such as Bell-type inequalities or quantum-mechanical
constraints). In the conditionalization approach one considers the conditions under which the random
variables are recorded as if they were values of another random variable, so that the observed distributions
are interpreted as conditional ones. This approach is uninformative with respect to relations between
the distributions observed under different conditions, because any set of such distributions is compatible
with any distribution assigned to the conditions.
Introduction
Joint Distributions and Stochastic Unrelatedness
Many scientific problems, from psychology to quantum mechanics, can be presented in terms of random
outputs of some system recorded under various conditions. According to the principle of Contextuality-
by-Default [1-4], when applying Kolmogorov’s probability theory (KPT) to such a problem, random
variables recorded under different, mutually incompatible conditions should be viewed as stochastically
unrelated to each other, i.e., possessing no joint distribution. They can always be “sewn together” as
part of their theoretical analysis, but joint distributions are then imposed on them rather than derived
from their identities. In this paper we discuss two possible approaches to the foundational issue of
“sewing together” stochastically unrelated random variables. We call these approaches contextualization
and conditionalization. The former takes the Contextuality-by-Default principle as its departure point
and is, in a sense, its straightforward extension; in the latter, Contextuality-by-Default is obtained as a
byproduct.
To understand why the Contextuality-by-Default principle is associated with either of these two
approaches, one should first of all abandon the naive notion that in KPT any two random variables have
a joint distribution uniquely determined by their definitions. A random variable is a measurable function
on a probability space, and the notion of a single probability space for all possible random variables (or,
equivalently, the notion of a single random variable of which all other random variables are functions)1
is untenable. It contradicts the commonly used KPT constructions.
1In this discussion we impose no restrictions on the domain and codomain probability spaces. A random variable therefore
is understood in the broadest possible way, including random vectors, random functions, random sets, etc. We will avoid,
however, the use of general measure-theoretic formalism.
One of them is, given any set, to construct a random variable whose range of possible values coincides
with this set. A probability space on which all such random variables were defined would have to include
a set of cardinality exceeding that of all possible sets, an impossibility.
Another commonly used construction is, given a random variable, to introduce another random vari-
able that has a given distribution and is stochastically independent of the former. The use of this
construction contradicts even the notion of a jointly distributed set of all variables with a particular
distribution [2], say, the set Norm(0, 1) of all standard-normally distributed random variables. Indeed, if
all random variables in Norm(0, 1) were jointly distributed, they would all be presentable as functions of
some random variable N , the identity function on the probability space on which the random variables
in Norm (0, 1) are defined. Choose now a standard-normally distributed random variable X so that it is
independent of N . Then it is also independent of any Y ∈ Norm(0, 1). Since X cannot be independent
of itself, X cannot belong to Norm(0, 1). At the same time, X must belong to Norm (0, 1) due to its
distribution.
Short of imposing on KPT artificial constraints (such as an upper limit on cardinality of the random
variables’ ranges), these and similar contradictions can only be dissolved by allowing for stochastically
unrelated random variables defined on different probability spaces (see Ref. [5] for how this can be
built into the basic set-up of probability theory). The principle of Contextuality-by-Default eliminates
guesswork from deciding which random variables are and which are not jointly distributed. Irrespective
of how one defines a system with random outputs and identifies the conditions under which these outputs
are recorded, the outputs are jointly distributed if they are recorded under one and the same set of
conditions; if they are recorded under different, mutually exclusive conditions, they are stochastically
unrelated.
Two Approaches
Contextualization and conditionalization differ in how they “sew together” stochastically unrelated ran-
dom variables. To demonstrate these differences on a simple example, let X and Y be random variables
with +1/−1 values, so that their distributions are determined by Pr [X = 1] and Pr [Y = 1], respectively.
Let X and Y be recorded under mutually exclusive conditions.
In contextualization (the approach we proposed in Refs. [1-4]), one first invokes the Contextuality-
by-Default principle to treat X and Y as stochastically unrelated random variables. A “sewing together”
of X and Y consists in probabilistically coupling them [6], i.e., presenting them as functions of a single
random variable. Put differently (but equivalently), we create a random variable (vector) Z = (X ′, Y ′)
such that X ′ is distributed asX and Y ′ is distributed as Y . The variablesX ′and Y ′ are jointly distributed
(otherwise Z would not be called a random variable, or a random vector), but this distribution is not
unique. Thus, X and Y can always be coupled as stochastically independent random variables, so that
Pr [X ′ = 1, Y ′ = 1] = Pr [X ′ = 1]× Pr [Y ′ = 1] . (1)
They can also be coupled as identical random variables,
Pr [X ′ = Y ′] = 1, (2)
but only if X and Y are distributed identically,
Pr [X = 1] = Pr [Y = 1] . (3)
There can, in fact, be an infinity of couplings, constrained only by
Pr [X ′ = 1, Y ′ = 1] + Pr [X ′ = 1, Y ′ = −1] = Pr [X = 1] ,
Pr [X ′ = 1, Y ′ = 1] + Pr [X ′ = −1, Y ′ = 1] = Pr [Y = 1] . (4)
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In conditionalization, one creates a random variable C with two possible values corresponding to the
two sets of conditions under which one recordsX and Y , respectively. Then one defines a random variable
U = (C, V ), such that the conditional distribution of V given C = 1 is the same as the distribution of X ,
and the conditional distribution of V given C = 2 is the same as the distribution of Y . In other words,
Pr [V = 1 |C = 1] = Pr [X = 1] ,
Pr [V = 1 |C = 2] = Pr [Y = 1] . (5)
The principle of Contextuality-by-Default here does not have to be invoked explicitly, but it is adhered
to anyway: the random variable V is related to conditions under which it is recorded, and V conditioned
on C = 1 clearly has no joint distribution with V conditioned on C = 2.
Conditionalization can also be implemented in more complex constructions, such as the one proposed
in Ref. [7]. In our example, this construction amounts to replacing V with two random variables, V1 and
V2, and “coordinating” their possible values with the values of C. Thus, one can make V1 and V2 binary,
+1/− 1, and define the conditional distributions by
Pr [V1 = v, V2 = 1 |C = 1] = Pr [V1 = v, V2 = −1 |C = 1] = 12 Pr [X = v] ,
Pr [V1 = 1, V2 = v |C = 2] = Pr [V1 = −1, V2 = v |C = 2] = 12 Pr [Y = v] ,
(6)
where v = 1 or −1. For C = 1, as we see, the “relevant” output is V1, and the probabilities of its values v
are simply evenly divided between the two possible values of the “irrelevant” output V2 (and for C = 2,
V1 and V2 exchange places).
We argue in this paper that only contextualization serves as a useful tool for classifying and charac-
terizing different types of systems involving random outputs that depend on conditions (e.g., classical-
mechanical vs quantum-mechanical systems). Conditionalization, both in its simplest and modified ver-
sions, is always applicable but uninformative.
Quantum Entanglement
Our analysis pertains to any input-output relations, as considered in Refs. [1-3,8-11]. The relations can
be physical, biological, behavioral, social, etc. For the sake of mathematical transparency, however, we
confine our consideration to the canonical quantum-mechanical paradigm [12] involving two entangled
particles, “Alice’s” and “Bob’s.” Alice measures the spin of her particle in one of two directions, α1 or α2
(values of the first input), and Bob measures the spin of his particle in one of two directions, β1 or β2
(values of the second input). Each pair of measurements is therefore characterized by one of four possible
combinations of input values (αi, βj), and it is these combinations that form the four conditions in this
example. The spins recorded in each trial are realizations of random variables (outputs) A and B, which,
in the simplest case of spin-1/2 particles, can attain two values each: “up” or “down” (encoded by +1 and
−1, respectively).
Aside from simplicity, another good reason for using this example is that it relates to the problem
of great interest in the foundation of physics: in what way and to what an extent one can embed joint
probabilities of spins in entangled particles into the framework of KPT? It may seem that this question
was answered by John Bell in his classical papers [13,14], and that the answer was: KPT is not compatible
with the joint distributions of spins in entangled particles. However, in Bell’s analysis and its subsequent
elaborations [15,16] the use of KPT is constrained by an added assumption that has nothing to do with
KPT. Namely, the implicit assumption in these analyses is that of “noncontextuality”:
a spin recorded in Alice’s particle is a random variable uniquely identified by the measurement
setting (spatial axis) for which it is recorded (and analogously for Bob’s particle).
In other words, the spin recorded by Alice for settings α1 and α2 are different random variables A1
and A2, but the identity of either of them does not depend on whether Bob’s setting is β1 or β2 (and
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analogously for Bob’s random variables B1, B2 corresponding to β1 and β2). For well-established reasons
(discussed in detail below), this makes a Kolmogorovian account of quantum entanglement impossible.
However, according to the Contextuality-by-Default principle, if one applies it to the Alice-Bob
paradigm,
any two random variables recorded under mutually exclusive conditions are labeled by these
conditions and considered stochastically unrelated.
Alice’s spin values recorded under the condition (α1, β1) cannot co-occur with the spin values recorded by
her under the condition (α1, β2), even though α1 is the same in both conditions. Therefore the identity
of the spin she measures under (α1, β1) should be viewed as different from the identity of the spin she
measures under (α1, β2).
This leads one to the double-indexation of the spins,
A11, A12, A21, A22, B11, B12, B21, B22, (7)
where Aij and Bij are the measurements by Alice and Bob, respectively, recorded under the condition
(αi, βj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}. This vector of random variables cannot be called a random vector (or random
variable, as we use the term broadly), because its components are not jointly distributed. Thus, A11
and A12, or A11 and B12, are recorded under mutually exclusive conditions, so they do not have jointly
observed realizations. But the outputs A11 and B11, being recorded under one and the same condition
(α1, β1), are jointly distributed, i.e., the joint probabilities for different combinations of co-occurring
values of A11 and B11 are well-defined. The situation is summarized in the following diagram:
B12
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(8)
Contextuality and No-Signaling
Why do we speak of “contextuality” and “noncontextuality”? The terms come from quantum mechanics
(see, e.g., Refs. [17-21]), although it is not always clear that they are used in the same meaning as in
the present paper. In the Alice-Bob paradigm with two spin-1/2 particles, the (marginal) distribution
of Alice’s measurement Aij does not depend on Bob’s setting βj , nor does the distribution of Bob’s
measurement Bij depend on αi:
Pr [A11 = 1] = Pr [A12 = 1] , Pr [A21 = 1] = Pr [A22 = 1] ,
Pr [B11 = 1] = Pr [B21 = 1] , Pr [B12 = 1] = Pr [B22 = 1] .
(9)
This is known as the no-signaling condition [22]: Alice, by watching outcomes of her measurements,
is not able to guess Bob’s settings, and vice versa. If the two particles are separated by a space-like
interval, violations of no-signaling would contravene special relativity (and imply the “spooky action at
a distance,” in Einstein’s words).
Nevertheless, in KPT, A cannot be indexed by αi alone, nor can B be indexed by βj alone.
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The logic forbidding single-indexation of the spins, A1, A2, B1, B2, is simple [4]. Since, for any i, j,
the random variables Ai and Bj are jointly distributed, they are defined on the same probability space.
Applying this consideration to (A1, B1), (A1, B2), and (A2, B1), we are forced to accept that all four
random variables, A1, A2, B1, B2, are defined on one and the same probability space. The existence of
this joint distribution, however, is known to be equivalent to Bell-type inequalities (see below), known
not to hold for entangled particles.
Therefore, in perfect compliance with the Contextuality-by-Default principle, we are forced to use the
double indexation (7). We can say that while βj does not influence Aij “directly” (which would be the
case if βj could affect the distribution of Aij), it generally creates a “context” for Aij . The context makes
Ai1 and Ai2 two different random variables with one and the same distribution, rather than one and the
same random variable. (Analogous reasoning applies to Bij in relation to αi.)
It should not, of course, come as a surprise that different random variables can be identically dis-
tributed. After all, it is perfectly possible that the distributions of Alice’s spins for α1 and α2 are identical
too, and this would not imply that they are one and the same random variable. Within the framework of
KPT, the difference between A11 and A12 is essentially the same as the difference between A11 and A21:
in both cases we deal with stochastically unrelated random variables, the only difference being that in
the former pair, unlike in the latter one, the no-signaling condition forces the two random variables to be
identically distributed. The notion of contextuality, however, does require broadening of one’s thinking
about how one decides that some empirical observations are and some are not realizations of one and the
same random variable, as understood in KPT [2,3].
Theory
Contextualization and Couplings
Contextualization is a straightforward extension of the Contextuality-by-Default principle. The latter
creates the eight random variables in (7), and the contextualization approach consists in directly imposing
a joint distribution on them. This can, of course, be done in infinitely many ways. Any random variable
Y = (A′11, A
′
12, A
′
21, A
′
22, B
′
11, B
′
12, B
′
21, B
′
22) (10)
such that, for any i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2,(
A′ij , B
′
ij
)
is distributed as (Aij , Bij) , (11)
is called a (probabilistic) coupling for (7) [6]. The fact that Y in (10) is referred to as a random variable (or
random vector) implies that the components of Y are jointly distributed, i.e., there is a joint probability
assigned to each of the 28 combinations of values for A′11, A
′
12, . . . , B
′
22.
The set of all possible couplings (10) for (7) is generally different for different distributions of the pairs
(Aij , Bij). However, it always includes the coupling Y in which the pairs
(
A′ij , B
′
ij
)
are stochastically
independent across different (i, j). This coupling is referred to as an independent coupling. Its universal
applicability leads to the common confusion of stochastic unrelatedness with stochastic independence.
But stochastic independence is merely a special property of a joint distribution.
The non-uniqueness of the coupling (10), rather than being a hindrance, can be advantageously used
in theoretical analysis. According to the All-Possible-Couplings principle formulated in Refs. [2,3],
a set of stochastically unrelated random variables is characterized by the set of all possible
couplings that can be imposed on them, with no couplings being a priori privileged.
Thus, according to Ref. [1], the set of all possible couplings for (7) can be used to characterize various
constraints imposed on the joint distributions of Aij , Bij in (8).
5
From the point of view of all possible couplings, the noncontextuality assumption leading to the
single-indexation of the spins, Ai, Bj , is equivalent to imposing an identity coupling on the double-indexed
outputs in (7), i.e., creating a coupling (10)-(11) with the additional constraint]
Pr [A′11 = A
′
12] = 1, Pr [A
′
21 = A
′
22] = 1,
Pr [B′11 = B
′
21] = 1, Pr [B
′
12 = B
′
22] = 1.
(12)
The Bell-type theorems [13-16] tell us that this coupling exists if and only if both the no-signaling
condition is satisfied and the four observable joint distributions of (Aij , Bij) satisfy the inequalities
|〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉 − 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2,
|〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉 − 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2,
|〈A11B11〉 − 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2,
|− 〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2,
(13)
where 〈. . .〉 denotes expected value. Clearly, these inequalities do not have to be satisfied, and, in the
Alice-Bob paradigm, for some quadruples of settings (α1, α2, β1, β2), these inequalities are contravened
by quantum theory and experimental data.
Therefore, we have to use double-indexing and consider couplings other than the identity coupling
(12). This is the essence of the contextualization approach, when applied to the Alice-Bob paradigm.
In the conditionalization approach, discussed next, one also uses what can be thought of as a version of
double-indexation (conditioning on the two indices viewed as values of a random variable), but instead
of the couplings in the sense of (10)-(11) one uses a different theoretical construct, conditional couplings.
Conditionalization and Conditional Couplings
One of the simplest ways of creating stochastically unrelated random variables is to consider a tree of
possibilities, like this one:
•
pi
  
  
  
   1−pi
❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
a
p

1 − p
❆❆
❆
  ❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
❆❆
b
1−q

q
⑦
~~⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦
c d
(14)
We have at the first stage outcomes a and b, and according as which of them is realized, the choice
between c and d occurs with generally different probabilities. We can consider a and b as two mutually
exclusive conditions, and use them to label the two random variables
Xa =
{
c with probability p,
d with probability 1− p, Xb =
{
c with probability q,
d with probability 1− q. (15)
Clearly, Xa and Xb here do not have a joint distribution: e.g., no joint probability Pr [Xa = c,Xb = c] is
defined because there is no commonly acceptable meaning in which Xa = c may “co-occur” with Xb = c.
The two random variables here are stochastically unrelated, in conformance with the Contextuality-by-
Default principle.
The All-Possible-Couplings principle leads us to consider all joint distributions
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X ′b = c X
′
b = d
X ′a = c r p− r
X ′a = d q − r 1− p− q + r
, (16)
with
max (0, p+ q − 1) ≤ r ≤ min (p, q) . (17)
Each r within this range defines a possible coupling Y = (X ′a, X
′
b) for Xa and Xb. In particular, the
independent coupling, with r = pq, is within the range, while the identity coupling, with Pr [Xa = Xb] = 1,
is possible if and only if r = p = q.
There is, however, a more traditional view of Xa and Xb in (14). It consists in considering a joint
distribution of two random variables, C and X , with the marginal distributions
C =
{
a with probability pi,
b with probability 1− pi, X =
{
c with probability ppi + q (1− pi) ,
d with probability (1− p)pi + (1− q) (1− pi) , (18)
and with the joint distribution
X = c X = d
C = a ppi (1− p)pi
C = b q (1− pi) (1− q) (1− pi)
. (19)
Xa is then interpreted as X given C = a, and analogously for Xb. The conditional probabilities are
computed as required,
p = Pr [X = c |C = a] , q = Pr [X = c |C = b] . (20)
The idea suggested by this simple exercise is this:
consider any set of stochastically unrelated random outputs labeled by mutually exclusive
conditions as if these conditions were values of some random variable, and the outputs were
values of another random variable conditioned upon the values of the former.
We call this approach conditionalization. It may seem to provide a simple alternative, within the frame-
work of KPT, to considering all couplings imposable on stochastically unrelated variables. We will argue,
however, that this alternative is not theoretically interesting.
Consider the conditionalization of our Alice-Bob paradigm. Denote, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2,
pij = Pr [Aij = 1, Bij = 1] ,
pi· = Pr [Aij = 1] ,
p·j = Pr [Bij = 1] .
(21)
Introduce a random variable C with four values
cij = (αi, βj) , i, j,∈ {1, 2} ,
and a random variable X = (A′, B′) with four values
(1, 1) , (1,−1) , (−1, 1) , (−1,−1) .
Form the tree of outcomes as shown below, using arbitrarily chosen positive probabilities pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22
(summing to 1):
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▲▲
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. . .
(1, 1) (1,−1) (−1, 1) (−1,−1)
(22)
The conditionalization is completed by computing the joint distribution of C and (A′, B′):
(A′, B′) = (1, 1) (1,−1) (−1, 1) (−1,−1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C = (αi, βj) pijpiij (pi· − pij)piij (p·j − pij)piij (1− pi· − p·j + pij)piij
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(23)
Clearly, we have constructed a random variable
Z = (C, (A′, B′)) (24)
such that
(A′, B′) given C = (αi, βj) is distributed as (Aij , Bij) . (25)
This Z can be called a conditional coupling for (Aij , Bij), i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The conditionalization procedure does not have to claim the existence of any “true” or unique distri-
bution of C. One can freely concoct this distribution, even if the conditions under which A and B are
measured are chosen at will or according to a deterministic algorithm.
There are two interesting modifications of conditionalization, both proposed in a recent paper by Avis,
Fischer, Hilbert, and Khrennikov [7]. Instead of the conditional coupling Z in (24), they consider
Z ′ = (C, (A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2)) (26)
such that (
A′i, B
′
j
)
given C = (αi, βj) is distributed as (Aij , Bij) . (27)
In other words,
Pr
[
A′i = ±1, B′j = ±1 |C = (αi, βj)
]
= Pr [Aij = ±1, Bij = ±1] . (28)
This does not yet define the conditional probabilities for all possible values of (A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2). Avis et
al. describe two ways of defining them.
In one of them A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2 have two possible values each, ±1, and
Pr
[
A′i = a,B
′
j = b, A
′
3−i = a
′, B′3−j = b
′, |C = (αi, βj)
]
=
1
4
Pr [Aij = a,Bij = b] . (29)
That is, the probability of
(
A′i = a,B
′
j = b
)
at C = (αi, βj) is evenly partitioned among the four values
of the “irrelevant” pair
(
A′3−i, B
′
3−j
)
. It is easy to see that one could as well use any other partitioning:
Pr
[
A′i = a,B
′
j = b, A
′
3−i = a
′, B′3−j = b
′, |C = (αi, βj)
]
= tij (a
′, b′) Pr [Aij = a,Bij = b] , (30)
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with nonnegative tij (a
′, b′) subject to
tij (1, 1) + tij (1,−1) + tij (−1, 1) + tij (−1,−1) = 1, i, j ∈ {1, 2} .
Now, for any distribution ofC with non-zero values of Pr [C = (αi, βj)], the joint distribution of (C,A
′
1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2)
is well-defined.
Another way of implementing (28) described in Ref. [7] is to allow each of A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2 to attain
a third value, say, 0, in addition to ±1. This third value can be interpreted as “is not defined.” It is
postulated then that
Pr
[
A′i = a,B
′
j = b, A
′
3−i = a
′, B′3−j = b
′, |C = (αi, βj)
]
=
{
Pr [Aij = a,Bij = b] if a 6= 0, b 6= 0, a′ = b′ = 0,
0 otherwise.
(31)
Again, it is easy to see that the joint distribution of (C,A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2) is well-defined and satisfies (28)
for any distribution of C with non-zero values of Pr [C = (αi, βj)].
Discussion: Comparing the Two Approaches
Conditionalization and contextualization achieve the same goal — “sewing together” stochastically un-
related random variables within the confines of KPT. But the similarity ends here. Consider, e.g., the
Alice-Bob experiment in which both Alice and Bob use some random generators to choose between two
possible measurement directions. Clearly then C is objectively a random variable, and a joint distribu-
tion of (A,B) and C objectively exists. Put differently, in this case (A′, B′) given C = (αi, βj) in (25) is
simply equal to (Aij , Bij).
However, whether C is objectively a random variable or a distribution for the settings is invented, the
quantum-mechanical analysis of the situation begins with computing the (conditional) distributions of
(A,B) at different settings. The distribution of C in no way advances our understanding of how (Aij , Bij)
for different (i, j) are related to each other.
Thus, we know that the entangled spin-1/2 particles are subject to Tsirelson’s inequalities [24]
|〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉 − 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2
√
2,
|〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉 − 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2
√
2,
|〈A11B11〉 − 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2
√
2,
|− 〈A11B11〉+ 〈A12B12〉+ 〈A21B21〉+ 〈A22B22〉| ≤ 2
√
2.
(32)
We also know that if the two particles were not entangled, they would be subject to the Bell-CH-Fine
inequalities (13). The difference between these two constraints is not reflected in the “true” distribution of
C, if it exists, nor is it implied by or can in any way restrict the possible choices of “imaginary” distributions
of C. In fact, the only restriction imposed on the distribution of C, a universal one, is that none of the
conditions should have probability zero, because this would make the conditional probabilities undefined.
Moreover, the set of possible conditional couplings is the same whether the no-signaling condition is or
is not satisfied.
Although in this discussion we assumed that conditionalization was implemented in its simplest ver-
sion, (24)-(25), our arguments and conclusions apply verbatim to the modifications proposed in Ref. [7]
and described at the end of the previous section. The conditional distributions of A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2 for the
four values of C in (29) and (31) are uniquely determined by the observed distributions of the four pairs
(Aij , Bij). But whatever these distributions, they can be paired with any distribution of C, provided
none of its values has zero probability.
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All of this stands in a clear contrast to the analysis of all possible couplings (10) in the contextualization
approach [1-4]. In this approach we can ask various questions about the compatibility of couplings with
various constraints known to hold for the observable joint distributions. Thus, we may ask about the
fitting set of couplings for a given constraint (say, Bell or Tsirelson inequalities), i.e., the couplings that
are compatible with the spin distributions subject to the constraint. We can also ask about the forcing
set of couplings, those compatible only with the spin distributions subject to a given constraint. Or we
can conjoin the two questions and ask about the equivalent set of couplings, those compatible with and
only with the spin distributions subject to the constraint. The answers to such questions will be different
for different constraints being considered.
Since the four observed joint distributions of
(
A′ij , B
′
ij
)
in (11) are themselves part of the couplings
(10), the questions above are only interesting if they are formulated in terms of the unobservable parts
of the couplings. In the examples below we characterize the couplings in terms of the connections [1,2,4],
which are the (unobservable) pairs
(A′11, A
′
12) , (A
′
21, A
′
22) , (B
′
11, B
′
21) , (B
′
12, B
′
22) . (33)
The diagram below shows the connections in their relation to the pairs whose joint distributions are
known from observations (compare with diagram (8)):
B′12
}}④④
④④
④④
④④
connect
//❴❴❴ B′22
joint !!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈
oo
A′12
joint
==
connect
✤
✤
✤
A′22
aa
connect
✤
✤
✤
A′11
joint
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈
OO✤
✤
✤
A′21
}}④④
④④
④④
④④
OO✤
✤
✤
B′11
aa
//❴❴❴ B′21
joint
==
connectoo
(34)
Let us assume that the probability of spin-up (+1) outcome for every (spin-1/2) particle in the Alice-
Bob paradigm is 1/2. (As shown in Ref. [23], this can always be achieved by a simple procedural
modification of the canonical Alice-Bob experiment.) This assumption is, of course, in compliance with
the no-signaling condition, which therefore can be omitted from all formulations below.
We know [1] that the following two statements about connections are equivalent:
(S1) a vector of connections (33) is compatible with and only with those distributions of
(Aij , Bij), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, that satisfy the Bell-CH-Fine inequalities (13);
is equivalent to
(S′1) a vector of connections (33) is such that
〈A11A12〉 = ±1, 〈A21A22〉 = ±1, 〈B11B21〉 = ±1, 〈B21B22〉 = ±1, (35)
where the number of + signs among the four expected values is 4,2, or 0.
The equivalence of these two statements is an expanded version of Fine’s theorem [16], whose formulation
in the language of connections is: the identity connections, those with
〈A11A12〉 = 〈A21A22〉 = 〈B11B21〉 = 〈B21B22〉 = 1, (36)
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are only compatible with distributions of (Aij , Bij) satisfying the Bell-CH-Fine inequalities; and if these
inequalities hold, then (Aij , Bij) can be coupled by means of the identity connections.
We also know [1] that the following two statements about connections are equivalent:
(S2) a vector of connections (33) is compatible with and only with those distributions of
(Aij , Bij), i, j,∈ {1, 2}, that satisfy the Tsirelson inequalities (32);
is equivalent to
(S′2) a vector of connections (33) is such that
max {± 〈A11A12〉 ± 〈A21A22〉 ± 〈B11B21〉 ± 〈B21B22〉 : number of +’s is even} = 2
(
3−
√
2
)
(37)
and
max {± 〈A11A12〉 ± 〈A21A22〉 ± 〈B11B21〉 ± 〈B21B22〉 : number of +’s is odd} ≤ 2. (38)
We see that although the expectations 〈Ai1Ai2〉 and 〈B1jB2j〉 for the connections are not observable, they
provide a theoretically meaningful way of characterizing the way in which the stochastically unrelated
and observable (Aij , Bij) are being “sewn together.” And these ways are different for the Bell-CH-Fine
and Tsirelson inequalities.
What can contextualization tell us about the basic predictions of the quantum theory for the Alice-Bob
experiment? The theory tells us that, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2,
〈AijBij〉 = −〈αi |βj〉, (39)
where 〈αi|βj〉 is the dot product of two unit vectors. It can be shown [25-27] that the four expectations
〈AijBij〉 can be presented in the form (39) using a quadruple of setting (α1, α2, β1, β2) if and only if
|arcsin 〈A11B11〉+ arcsin 〈A12B12〉+ arcsin 〈A21B21〉 − arcsin 〈A22B22〉| ≤ pi,
|arcsin 〈A11B11〉+ arcsin 〈A12B12〉 − arcsin 〈A21B21〉+ arcsin 〈A22B22〉| ≤ pi,
|arcsin 〈A11B11〉 − arcsin 〈A12B12〉+ arcsin 〈A21B21〉+ arcsin 〈A22B22〉| ≤ pi,
|− arcsin 〈A11B11〉+ arcsin 〈A12B12〉+ arcsin 〈A21B21〉+ arcsin 〈A22B22〉| ≤ pi.
(40)
These inequalities are “sandwiched” between the Bell-CH-Fine ones and Tsirelson ones. That is, they are
implied by the former and imply the latter. It is shown in Ref. [4] that
(S3) there is no vector of connections (33) that is compatible with and only with those distri-
butions of (Aij , Bij), i, j,∈ {1, 2}, that satisfy the quantum inequalities (40).
Moreover, this negative statement still holds if one replaces the connections (33) with any other subsets
of (10), e.g.,
(A′11, A
′
12, A
′
21, A
′
22) , (B
′
11, B
′
12, B
′
21, B
′
22) . (41)
No distributions of such subsets are compatible with and only with those distributions of (Aij , Bij) that
satisfy the quantum inequalities (40).
The investigation of the forcing set of couplings provides additional insights into the special nature
of quantum mechanics. The result we have [4] says that the following two statements about connections
are equivalent (note the change from “with and only with” of the previous statements to “only with”):
(S4) a vector of connections (33) is compatible only with those distributions of (Aij , Bij),
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, that satisfy the quantum inequalities (40);
is equivalent to
(S′4) a vector of connections (33) is compatible only with those distributions of (Aij , Bij),
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, that satisfy the Bell-CH-Fine inequalities (13).
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In other words, a choice of connections can force all (Aij , Bij) compatible with them to comply with
quantum mechanics only in the form of their compliance with classical mechanics.
Conclusion
The examples just given should suffice to illustrate the point made: while both contextualization and
conditionalization embed any input-output relation into the framework of KPT, only contextualization
provides a useful tool for understanding the nature of various constraints imposed on the observable joint
distributions (one could say also, for different types and levels of contextuality). Conditionalization is
uninformative, as any distribution of the conditions is compatible with any distributions of the conditional
random variables.
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